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Idrees Yahaya Adamu Federal University Kashere, Gombe Nigeria 
This study explores the idea of Islamic banks requesting for collateral or guarantee when financing, 
the rationale for requesting loan security, and its acceptability from Islamic perspectives. The study 
reviewed the previous literature and Islamic injunctions to study and justify the use of collateral and 
guarantor to hedge the risk of financing default. It is found that Islamic banks like conventional 
banking system encourage requesting loan security to ensure borrowers’ commitment and protect 
investors’ wealth. Despite its effect on loan rejection, secured loans are found to be recovered more 
easily than unsecured loans. Government and Islamic banks are therefore advised to device mean for 
helping small-scale businesses to access financing, through credit guarantee schemes and participatory 
financing mechanisms, to enhance financial inclusion. 
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Introduction 
Over the years, scholars deliberated on the supposed responsibility of Islamic banks towards lending to small 
businesses. Scholars unanimously agree that Islamic banks are Shariah compliant profit-making businesses 
who need to take all measures to ensure safety of depositors’ funds as well as to have a good return on 
investment. Therefore, Islamic banks cannot be compelled to take any uncalculated risk of parting with 
money without adequate security. There are also diverse views that, one of the fundamental objectives of 
Islamic financial system is to reduce complications in extending loans/financing from conventional banks. 
Therefore, requesting collateral before Islamic bank financing did not make it more distinct from 
conventional bank lending or financing. Scholars in one hand unanimously viewed the concept of extending 
benevolent loans without requiring any form of material benefit as one of the objectives of Islamic 
brotherhood, while in the other hand, they looked at the primary motive of establishing Islamic banks as 
holistic profit-making institutions. To achieve the two objectives, Islamic banks are expected to extent 
financial facilities to its customers using Shariah compliant financing instruments or mode of financing, 
Islamic banks can be more passionate to its customers than conventional banks, and at the same time ensure 
safety of depositors’ and investors’ funds.  
Collateral and third-party guarantee are two main forms of financing security financial institutions require 
from borrowers during documentation process before parting with funds. This requirement is used as a 
buffer to fall upon in the event of borrower’s failure to fulfil obligations, they also motivate borrower towards 
prompt repayment commitment. To feel secured from possible default, Islamic banks can hold valuable 
assets, tittles, and other form of assurances like land tittles, gold, other precious, valuable and liquid assets, 
Shariah compliant debentures or sukuk certificates, Shariah compliant shares certificates, takaful (Islamic 
insurance), third party or institutional guarantee, cash deposit, domiciliation of payment, negative pledge, 
Ijarah agreement, assignment of debt, letter of comfort/awareness written by a reputable person or company 
to a lending institution acknowledging support of its subsidiary borrowing from the bank, as well as any other 
means that can give comfort to Islamic bank so long as it is compliant with Shariah. Therefore, the major 
issues related to loan security is availability, acceptability, and compliance, as discussed in problem statement 
below. 
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Research problem 
The main purposes of financing contract are mutual benefit as well as recovery of funds. In any finance 
related transaction, risk mitigation and protection against moral hazard are very important decisions to ensure 
safety of funds (Booth & Booth, 2006). This may be the reason financial institutions requires various forms of 
documentations before committing their funds. However, Petersen and Rajan (1994) realized that despite 
benefits individuals and small businesses get from bank lending, some individuals or institutions may lack an 
asset or property to fledge as a collateral and may not find a worthy individual or institution to guarantee their 
repayment. This may be an impediment to obtaining financing to a borrower. Should Islamic banks rely on 
mutual trust or verbal commitment to give out financing or they should also turn-down demanding 
borrowers on the ground of lack of collateral or guarantor. In some cases, a borrower may have an asset, but, 
banks may consider that asset as insufficient or unacceptable to serve as collateral. If Islamic banks deny 
financing on this ground, the objective of inclusive finance may not be achieved. Islamic banks in the other 
hand should not indiscriminately give out money to fulfil inclusive finance objective. Meanwhile, to what 
extent Islamic banks are allowed by Shariah to rely on collateral or guarantee in financing contract may need 
to be discussed. 
Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of this paper are to review previous literature and Islamic injunctions to study the reasons why 
Islamic banks are demanding for a reputable guarantor or collateral to secure loans against repayment default 
and its permissibility from Islamic perspective.  
Methodology 
This paper is critical literature review based, which reviewed the previous studies on the idea of collateral and 
guarantee from Islamic and conventional lending practice. After a careful review of literature, the author used 
his theoretical knowledge and banking practice experience to draw conclusion, it is pertinent that, the author 
used Islamic literature to justify the permissibility of requiring guarantee or collateral to extend financing. The 
paper justifies the significance of this study, a literature gap identified, as well as the areas for future research 
need. 
Literature Review 
Previous literature related to loan security (guarantor or collateral pledging) from Islamic and conventional 
perspectives were reviewed, the rationale for financial institutions to demand security were also reviewed to 
justify the current practice of Islamic banks, as discussed below: 
Loan Security 
The idea of collateral or guarantee to protect a bank from undue loss on lending is derived from the fact that 
moral hazard is problematic in financial relationship, that is the borrower’s tendency to inappropriately spend 
the borrowed funds with bad intent. Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001) and Edelberg (2004) discovered 
that, borrowers may likely misappropriate funds if they know there is no consequences for their action. 
Therefore, it is suggested that collateral or guarantee is in place to give creditor a right to repossess for 
recovery of investors’ funds in case of any strategic default (Manove et al., 2001). Allen N Berger, Espinosa-
Vega, Frame, and Miller (2011), Allen N. Berger, Frame, and Ioannidou (2016) and Frame, Srinivasan, and 
Woosley (2001) emphasized that banks should engage in projects’ screening to reduce the chances of project 
failure before financing, and at the same time, be adequately covered with collateral or guarantee to mitigate 
risk, thereby control their recovery and social cost. Therefore, project screening is better emphasized than low 
cost of credit and restrictions on collateral requirement. Abildgren, Drejer, and Kuchler (2013) found that, 
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some lenders base their decision to lend on availability of adequate collateral, not minding borrowers’ benefits 
on loans, while on the contrary Jiménez and Saurina (2004) found that collateralized loans have higher default 
probability.  
Abdouli (1991) assert that Islamic banking would contribute better in the growth of small businesses than the 
conventional banking with its participatory mechanism of financing, which does not require tangible 
collateral. However, a lot of small scale borrowers are not worthy investors for participatory financing. 
Therefore, Islamic banks prefer to finance their projects with debt-based financing, which requires adequate 
loan security. Meanwhile, the Islamic banks’ requirement of collateral has a tendency of discriminating poor 
clients in favor of the propertied rich (Pearlman, 2012).  
In the study Nasir, Khalid, and Mahmood (2004), they found that Islamic financial institutions are providing 
financial assistance to needy people with a strong collateral or a guarantee. The borrowers surrender their 
precious assets or tittles which are usually of higher value to obtain funds from lenders. This collateral 
constitutes the backbone for prompt repayment of these funds to financial institutions. Sharif, Shaharuddin, 
Muhamed, Pauzi, and Zin (2013), explored the potentials of using collateral (Ar-Rahn) acceptance by Islamic 
financial institutions to extend financing facilities to entrepreneurs through pawnshop. This may enhance 
access to finance, comfortable, less cost, and easy lending. They concluded that if implemented it will 
becomes a complimentary product in the financial markets. 
Maulidia (2003) contributed that, since pawnshop serves various purposes such as safe custody and loans 
security. Therefore, it is appropriate for pawnshops or financial institutions to charge processing fees, 
appraisal fees, and safe custody charges. This may be a source of income to the lender instead of relying on 
interest bearing financial services. Rajan and Winton (1995)argue that collateral may serve as an instrument to 
increase the lender’s monitoring incentive and comfort zone, because collateral is only likely effective if its 
value is constantly and consistently monitored. Therefore, holding collateral may increase cost of monitoring 
financial obligations. 
(al-Anshari, n.d.)added that financial institutions may require collateral to secure their funds, because lending 
to customers is among the riskiest part of their business. They lend investors’ funds to borrowers, as they are 
lending, they experience different forms of problems from borrowers which result to strategic default. 
Therefore, they rely on holding collateral assets to be assured that investor’ funds are safe. Hamid, Rahman, & 
Halim, (2014) attempted to examine the theoretical and practical factors of accepting Islamic-based pawn 
broking (Ar-Rahn) scheme in Malaysian using seven factors such as Shariah view, pricing system, pledge 
assets, customer service, locality, social and advertisement factors. They realized that, Shariah view have the 
highest mean score followed by pricing then pledged asset. This indicate that, the key criteria that all customer 
emphasis when they choose the services of Ar-Rahn scheme is Shariah compliance and pricing. Lawal (2016) 
quoted Badagawa (2006) that, financial institutions require borrowers to present to them assets which would 
be in form of physical property, land and building titles, vehicle logbooks and other assets. In case of failure 
to repay by the borrowers, these assets will be seized by the lending institutions and sold off to get back part 
whole of the borrowed funds. 
Booth and Booth (2006) established a cost-benefit relationship of borrowing cost and collateral issue; they 
found that, collateral pledging decisions are consistent with minimized cost of borrowing. Borrower pledging 
collateral means a bank is hedging the loan against risk, hence the lower expected return goes with the lower 
risk taken. It is also found that, Islamic banking participatory products according to some researchers like Al-
Ajmi, Abo Hussain, and Al-Saleh (2009) are likely to have higher transaction cost than interest bearing loans, 
the absence of collateral tendering has normalized effect of the cost difference.  
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Various studies like that of Akpan, Patrick, Udoka, Offiong, and Okon (2013) and Manove et al. (2001) found 
that non-availability of collateral is a major problem to borrowers. However, for a lending bank to feel safe, 
they may request for a guarantor in place of collateral.  A guarantor is a third party (person, group of persons 
or institution) that can agree and sign to undertake to be held liable for payment of debt obligation in the 
event the borrower defaulted. In conventional setting, most of the time it’s a job of the private guarantee 
firms or insurance cover that serve as a guarantor to borrower’s project. Therefore, riskier borrowers prefer 
to pledge collateral than guarantee to avoid additional cost (Chen, 2006). Although, loan guarantee schemes 
have incremental effect on the cost of loans, but it remains important in increasing access to financing. The 
incremental effect can as well be reduced if government can serve as a guarantor to small scale businesses (A. 
Riding, Madill, & Haines, 2007). In another study, A. L. Riding and Haines (2001) reiterated the importance 
of government serving as a guarantor to small businesses as its contribution to economic growth and 
employment generation. Chang, Chung, and Yu (2006) found group lending guarantee as more effective in 
reducing probability of loan default. 
Guttman (2007) realized in a moral hazard model of group lending to micro credit borrowers that group size 
is insignificant to repayment performance, but social collateral has significant influence on repayment 
performance. This influence is possible only when the group members are willing to apply social sanctions on 
delinquent borrowers. Sometimes, the design of collective credit agreements where all members are jointly 
responsible can potentially induce peer monitoring, enhance the lender’s ability to elicit debt repayments and 
reduce the incidence of strategic default (De Aghion, 1999). Financial institutions’ reliance on joint liability 
lending to the poor are common in developing countries. This is largely due to its informational and 
enforcement advantages over other forms of lending. Collective lending promotes screening, monitoring, 
verification, and enforcement of repayment (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999). However, the success of joint 
liability lending depends on the borrowers’ willingness to cooperate with one another on a common goal, 
Paxton (1996) and the success of group lending repayment rates vary dramatically from one program to 
another, suggesting an inherent instability in the financial technology. Simtowe, Zeller, and Phiri (2006) found 
that lenders feel comfortable and relaxed with group lending to mitigate moral hazard. Lending institutions 
relying on social cohesion and dynamic incentives enhance borrowers’ creditworthiness and it has direct 
implications on borrowers’ future outreach, impact, credit rating and sustainability. 
Why Islamic banks need to secure their loans? 
Extending loan to a needy by Islamic bank can be considered as an act of Ibadah (good deed), as long as it is 
within the Shariah mandate and the funds can be utilized judiciously. This is justified by the hadith of the 
Prophet (SAW) in Sunan Ibn Majah, The Chapters on Charity Book 15, Hadith 2525 as follows: 
“It was narrated from Anas bin Malik that the Messenger of Allah (SAW) said: "On the night on 
which I was taken on the Night Journey (Isra), I saw written at the gate of Paradise: 'Charity 
brings a ten-fold reward and a loan brings an eighteen-fold reward.' I said: 'O Jibril! Why is a 
loan better than charity?' He said: 'Because the beggar asks when he has something, but the 
one who asks for loan does so only because he is in need.' “(Da'if) (Siddiqui, 1972e). 
In the work of Bensaid, Grine, Nor, and Yusoff (2013), most loans are genuinely for business purposes or 
necessary to augment consumption. Therefore, it is good to offer loans, because the person who ask is in 
need, the lender can be rewarded for it. Meanwhile, banks cannot rely on willingness to give out loans without 
consideration for possible risk of not being paid back. It is therefore recommended to lenders that they 
should at the same time take extra care in protecting funds against undue default of repayment. 
Ibn Kathir is one of the scholars that explained very well about collateral (Arrahn) in surah al Baqarah verse 
283 (Al-Qurashi, 1999). Bukhari and Muslim also recorded many hadiths about collateral and guarantee. 
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Other great Islamic scholars such as Ibn-Abidin, al-Ḥaṣkafi and al- Shaybani of Ḥanafi, described the need for 
collateralization of asset in lending, how it is applied, and its principles. They also discussed the need for 
financial institutions use collateral or guarantee to secure loans. 
Business involving debt obligation requires familiarity between lender and borrower. Nowadays, relationships 
are easily built using modern information processing system, which eases lender-borrower relationship, but, 
cannot guarantee repayment of debt obligation (Kong, Turvey, Xu, & Liu, 2014). According to the literature 
of Chakravarty and Yilmazer (2005), lenders cannot just rely on credit scoring information alone to give out 
financing, they need to be extra careful to monitor the effect of possible moral hazard of borrowers. Frame et 
al. (2001) while writing on the effect of credit scoring, assert that lenders are now ready to take risk of lending 
to consumers, particularly through credit card, which has relatively lower default rate, but, they constantly 
monitor customers. Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2009) realized the advantage of repeated 
lending to the same borrower, which overtime reduce borrower transparency investigation cost and a chance 
of borrowing at a lower cost, but, lenders require periodic review of borrowers’ credit score. In the work of 
Akpan et al. (2013), where they examined the determinants of credit access and demand in Nigeria, years of 
borrowing experience and relationship, level of education and availability of collateral or surety determines 
amount a bank can lend to its client. Clients’ continuous loyalty may likely influence bank’s ability to extend 
credit to borrowers without collateral. 
Permissibility of Collateral in Shariah 
Islamic banks may require collateral to protect themselves against possible default by borrower. The idea of 
collateral is derived from the concept of Ar-Rahn (pawning). Ar-Rahn means pledging of an asset or tittle as a 
security to obtain loan or financing from a pawnshop. The concept of Ar-Rahn has a legal justification from 
the holy Qur’an in surah al-Baqarah verse 283: 
“And if you are on a journey and cannot find scribe, then a security deposit (should be) taken”. 
(Al-Qurashi, 1999). 
Another Hadith of the Holy prophet (SAW) from Sahih al-Bukhari sales and trade Book 34, Hadith 49 also 
gave a justification for using collateral as follows:  
Narrated '`Aisha: “Allah's Messenger (PBUH) bought food grains from a Jew on credit and 
mortgaged his armor to him” (as collateral). (Siddiqui, 1972b) 
Banks alternatively require borrower to present a guarantor, who may be held liable in case of strategic 
default. In the Islamic perspective, guarantor is a person interceding for borrower to access financing and is 
liable if borrower defaulted based on the following Hadith in Sunan Ibn Majah, the chapters on charity Book 
15, Hadith 2497: 
Narrated Shurahbil bin Muslim Al-Khawlani said: I heard Abu Umamah Al-Bahil say: "I heard 
the Messenger of Allah (SAW) say: "The guarantor is responsible, and the debt must be repaid" 
(Hasan) (Siddiqui, 1972d) 
Interceding (guarantee) may be a risky responsibility, but, it is encouraged in Islam to mutually help one 
another. If a person need intercession (guarantee) in his business obligation or in borrowing, it is good to 
assist him, as recommended by the Prophet SAW in Sahih al-Bukhari, book of Tawheed book 97, Hadith 102 
Narrated 'Abu Musa: Whenever a beggar or a person in need of something came to the 
Prophet (PBUH), he used to say (to his companions), "Intercede (for him) and you will be 
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rewarded for that, and Allah will fulfill what He will through His Apostle's tongue." (Siddiqui, 
1972a). 
Sometimes group guarantee may be required to large number of borrowers from a single source. The Prophet 
SAW encouraged this act as an Ibadah in Jami' at-Tirmidhi, chapters on the description of the day of 
judgment, Ar-Riqaq, and Al Wara' Book 37, Hadith 2627. 
Abu Sa'eed narrated the Messenger of Allah (SAW) said: "Indeed in my Ummah there are those 
who intercede for large groups of people, and among them (there are) who intercede for a 
tribe, and among them (there are) who intercede for a group and among them (there are) who 
intercede for a man, until they are admitted to Paradise." (Da'if) (Siddiqui, 1972d) 
In another hadith of Sunan Abu Dawood, Wages (Kitab Al-Ijarah) Book 24, Hadith 126, it is not allowed to 
get paid for intercession (guarantee), it is regarded as an act of Ibadah (help) as the Prophet SAW said: 
Narrated Abu-Umamah: The Prophet (SAW) said: If anyone intercedes for his brother and he 
present a gift to him for it and he accepts it, he approaches a great door of the doors of usury. 
(Siddiqui, 1972c). 
Therefore, the concept of guarantor differs in Islamic and conventional perspective, in such a way that no fee 
is paid for intercession in Islam and the beneficiary of the guarantee is expected to fear Allah (SWT) in 
discharging his contractual obligation appropriately. Guarantor is expected to intercede as an Ibadah 
(worship), despite the liability attached to be a guarantor.  
Current Practices of Islamic Banks 
Islamic banks like their conventional counterparts requires collateral or guarantee to cover loans against 
possible default. They are not requesting for loan security because they are wishing to create complications, 
but, to avoid the effect of moral hazard from dubious customers who wish to illegally extort banks’ money. 
They also rely on the permissibility of collateral and guarantee from Islamic perspective to create a comfort 
zone for themselves. Islamic banks use the concept of loan security to ensure that only committed and 
serious-minded borrowers are being financed. 
Islamic banks are careful enough to avoid rejecting genuine loan request on the ground of lack of collateral or 
guarantor, by devising other means of financing like hire-purchase. Even though, the asset financed serves as 
a collateral for financing yet Islamic banks are also careful to avoid financing wrong business projects just 
because the entrepreneur has a collateral or guarantee. Islamic banks engage on other means of project 
screening to ensure genuineness of the project to be financed.  
Islamic banks sometimes reject financing request of customers who do not fulfil certain conditions or 
requirements. Even though, a customer’s loan request may possibility be rejected for genuine reasons, 
rejection for lack of collateral or guarantor may not be welcomed by a customer who needs immediate 
financing, sometimes rejection may turn to be a blessing in disguise Krasniqi (2010), particularly when the 
consumption is not necessary or time bound. Bai and Lu (2018) found only risk averse and higher income 
earning borrowers are likely to reject loans previously applied, if the terms of the loan are not favorable to 
them. Such borrowers have advantage of privileged information, bargaining power, knowledge, and 
alternative source of financing. Usually, lenders hardly reject their funding request because they seem to be 
qualified by all ramifications. But, small and unexperienced borrowers’ request for loan were usually denied 
on the ground of inadequate loan security. 
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Impact of business financing can be assessed based on the cost benefit analysis of the borrowing, Adams and 
Nehman (1979) defined cost of borrowing as official rate payable, borrowers’ loan transaction costs and 
changes in the purchasing power of money.  If cost associated with borrowing exceeds benefit, then the loan 
process has negative impact on clients. This cost comprises not only interest or profits chargeable by lending 
bank, but including all processing charges/fees, associated tax if any, commission on transactions as well as 
additional expenses a borrower may incur on the process of accessing financing. Consumer borrowers incur 
substantially high-priced cost of borrowing from formal loans market compared to large scale borrowers, 
Adams and Nehman (1979) argue that high borrowing costs is deterrent to small-scale financing, particularly 
those living with low income or in developing countries. It is realized that, cost associated to documenting 
collateral tremendously increases cost of financing.  
Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia (2002) established that small consumers spend higher as a borrowing cost from 
low capitalized and bigger lending corporations. In the study of (Petersen & Rajan, 1994) long standing 
banking business or lending relationship can only increase availability of credits but do not have effect on cost 
of borrowing. While, high cost of loans supposed to deter borrowers, sometimes cost of borrowing does not 
affect borrower behavior, but, individuals’ rationality does (Morduch, 2010); some borrowers just have a 
preference to borrow even if they have savings. This is evidenced by borrowers in India, who are more willing 
to take loans than to temper with their savings, and others who borrow while they have an asset that can be 
easily converted to cash, claiming that borrowed funds can be repaid faster than tempered savings. Dasgupta 
(1972) suggest the use of financial and non-financial cost-benefit analysis to measure the worthiness of 
borrowing using indices like utility, social cost-benefits, input constraints, time value and time phasing, risk 
and uncertainty, disaster and loss control, availability of alternative, objective and subjective probabilities as 
well as your future and for public good which can be used to measure the worthiness of borrowing. 
Discussions and Recommendations 
Despite permissibility and importance of requiring loan security by banks, it is an impediment to the current 
financial inclusion strategy objectives, because it deters small scale borrowers from applying for bank 
financing. Although, banks have genuine reason to reject loan applications for fear of default, but it is not 
supposed to deter small borrowers from access to financing. Therefore, banks should device a means to help 
small business borrowers at the same time protecting investors’ funds. 
Government intervention schemes are supposed to compliment the objectives of financial inclusion strategy 
through easy access to bank financing. Government through central banks should establish loan guarantee 
schemes for small business borrowers, through associations and clubs. 
Religious obligations of extending benevolent loans to low income earners is not enough reason to extend 
loans so long as there is possibility of defaulting. Therefore, the society should intensify effort to mitigate risk 
of loans default and moral hazard issues.  
It is realized that, banks are more comfortable to extend loans to group of small scale borrowers if they form 
an association with group guarantee. In group guarantee, all group members stand to be guarantors for one 
another, where default by one member means default by all the group members. Therefore, slam scale 
borrowers are advised to from a group in the form of cooperative society to obtain loans with group 
guarantee. 
It is therefore, recommended that future research should look at a better way for Islamic banks to extend 
financing (both participatory and non-participatory) to small businesses without the need of collateral or 
guarantee, at a lowest possible default rate. Future research should also review current practice to see if 
Islamic banks are compassionate to small scale businesses towards lending relationship and suggest way 
forward to increase lending to small businesses.  
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